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Written by Lucretius in the First Century BCE, De Rerum Natura is an elaboration of 
Epicurean atomism that ranges over the origin of the universe, the formation of 
worlds, weather systems, the emergence of life and of social order, morality, and 
much else besides.i It can be picked over for interesting anticipations of modern 
atomism and of evolutionary theory. Yet, as a materialist account of the emergence 
of order, it depends on an account of causality and law which has some surprises, 
and it is on these that I want to focus here. The familiar image of atoms moving and 
combining may lead one to expect that order in the universe depends ultimately on 
fixed laws governing the movement of atoms. Although there are some grounds for 
such a reading, they are not compelling, and Lucretius is otherwise quite clear that 
order consists of regularities that arise locally, varying from time to time and from 
place to place. That this theory of local regularities has been eclipsed by the 
assumption that laws are fixed says more about our own views than those of 
Lucretius. From the standpoint of contemporary approaches to causality, Lucretius’ 
account can be described as a regularity theory, where the regularities in question are 
a feature of the world (and not just of our perception of it). But it is distinctive in 
that cause and effect do not always and everywhere proceed according to the same 
invariable laws. Instead, causality precedes laws, which, as regularities, emerge 
locally and evolve along with the phenomena they determine. The causal structure of 
the universe is therefore real, but radically contingent. This idea sets Lucretius’ 
account apart from almost all existing theories of causality and law. Notable 
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exceptions can be found in the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, to some extent in 
that of Émile Boutroux, and in certain quarters of contemporary cosmology. For 
example, Peirce writes that “there is room for serious doubt whether the 
fundamental laws of mechanics hold good for single atoms,” and advises that 
science turn its attention to “a natural history of laws of nature.”ii On his part, 
Boutroux declares that “it is chance, or destiny, or an ensemble of capricious wills, 
that presides in the universe.”iii However, in this paper I will focus on the work of 
Lee Smolin, and in particular on his recent collaboration with Roberto Mangabeira 
Unger, The Singular Universe and the Reality of Time, which presents a 
comprehensive case for separating causality and law, and recognizing that the laws 
of nature evolve; an idea he first proposed over twenty years ago in The Life of the 
Cosmos.iv 
 Smolin has, for several decades, been at the forefront of research in quantum 
gravity, which aims to combine the key elements of quantum physics and the theory 
of general relativity. One of the many challenges this presents is that of bringing 
together two fundamentally different approaches to space and time. Einstein’s 
general theory of relativity describes space and time as intimately related to events, 
and as variable according to the perspective or frame of reference one takes up. With 
no absolute scale of time on which to pin events, a change in perspective may entail 
a change the order between events. Ascertaining the causal relations between events 
is therefore crucial to determining the structure of space and time; or, as Smolin puts 
it, “almost all of the information needed to construct the geometry of space-time 
consists of the story of the causal structure.”v By contrast, quantum physics assumes 
that space and time are independent of the events that take place in them. So, 
however strange the behavior of matter at the quantum level may be, there is a 
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certain simplicity to the causal structure. One way to combine these two theories 
involves introducing into quantum physics the kind of interdependence between 
events and the structure of space and time that characterizes the theory of general 
relativity. In this way, the significance of the causal structure of events in the theory 
of general relativity is carried over to the account of quantum gravity that Smolin 
and his fellow researchers propose, and thereby to the whole cosmology based on it. 
However, Unger and Smolin argue that in order for any such account to be 
successful, cosmology itself must take a further radical step and revise its 
understanding of the laws of nature and their relation to time. 
 Unger and Smolin note that physics is still marked by traces of an absolutism 
that underpinned Newtonian science, most clearly in the assumption that the 
fundamental equations of science, and by implication the fundamental reality they 
describe, are timeless. According to this longstanding orthodoxy, the changing 
universe can be explained by appealing to what does not change, and the aim of 
science is to discover laws that are universal and eternal. Far from being merely a 
matter for philosophical speculation that need not trouble science and working 
scientists, this assumption has, they argue, led contemporary cosmology into dead 
ends and wild goose chases. Their aim is to root it out, and to show that cosmology 
can do perfectly well without it.  
 
ii. 
Although twentieth-century science was marked by at least two decisive breaks with 
the Newtonian paradigm, in quantum physics and the special and general theories of 
relativity, the search for a unified law-based account of the universe has remained 
the norm. In particular, the laws themselves, expressed mathematically, continue to 
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be regarded as timeless; which is to say, the laws governing change do not 
themselves change. Accepting this leaves cosmology facing two fundamental 
puzzles. First, why are the laws of nature the way they are and not otherwise? 
Second, why were the initial conditions of the universe as we understand them to 
have been and not otherwise? The problem is that a scientific account of any given 
system applies the appropriate laws to the initial conditions without asking where 
either come from or why they are as they are. There are ways to manage this deficit 
when dealing with a part of the universe in isolation, but to leave such questions 
unanswered when dealing with the universe as a whole is to concede that cosmology 
is radically incomplete. Yet to propose a conclusive “once and for all” answer would 
invoke a Leibnizian conception of sufficient reason that drags science 
uncomfortably far from its empirical point of reference. The current orthodoxy 
leaves cosmology torn between these two unsatisfactory alternatives.  
 Unger and Smolin’s response to this predicament is to challenge the basic 
assumptions on which it rests, allowing a new possibility to emerge, one in which an 
adequate cosmological explanation does not have to be “complete” in the Leibnizian 
sense. Their approach can be encapsulated in what they identify as two cosmological 
fallacies, a reference both to the fact that they concern cosmology and to the 
standard objection to the cosmological argument for the existence of God: that it 
applies to the whole a form of reasoning appropriate only to a part. The first fallacy 
concerns the Newtonian paradigm according to which to explain how a given system 
(such as a collection of particles in a box) behaves over time one has to determine 
the initial conditions (the kind, position, and velocity of all the particles), and then 
apply the appropriate physical laws. The initial conditions are the starting point for 
the phenomena that the laws explain, but they are not themselves explained by those 
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laws: “they are assumed rather than explained.”vi This is fine where the task is to 
explain a well-defined closed system, because there is always an “outside” for the 
observer and theoretician to occupy; one that is fictitiously timeless. In principle, 
what is assumed in the account of one part can then be addressed by another, and the 
universe gradually explained bit by bit. But when the task is to explain the universe 
as a whole it is impossible to take a position “outside” the system, and there can be 
no switching of positions to fill out the account. This shows that the assumption of 
initial conditions becomes problematic when dealing with the universe as a whole. 
On their part, the laws that are to explain why the initial conditions of the system 
develop in a given way are regarded as timeless, unaffected by the changes they 
govern, and having no history of their own. Like the initial conditions of the 
configuration space, they are assumed by the explanation that follows, and therefore 
“to ask why they are what they are is to pose a question that lies in principle beyond 
the limits of a natural science conforming to the Newtonian paradigm.”vii Yet the 
point of cosmology, Unger and Smolin remind us, is to explain everything, and by 
adopting a model of explanation that makes this impossible science allows itself to 
remain shaped by metaphysical forms of thought that it professes to oppose. It is by 
failing to recognize this, or by ducking the challenge, that Unger and Smolin think 
science commits the first cosmological fallacy. 
 Where the first cosmological fallacy concerns a mistake in method, the 
second, which they call the “fallacy of universal anachronism” (Unger and Smolin 
2015: 23), arises from negligence over what science actually takes to be the case. It 
is accepted that the universe is cooling down and that the relatively stable structure 
described by modern science was preceded by a phase in which energy levels were 
so extreme that the physical laws as we know them could not have applied. In this 
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period, the universe worked in ways we do not recognize and could not derive from 
observation today. Similarly, it is possible that at some point in the distant future the 
universe may become quite different to the way it is now, and indeed that there may 
exist exceptional regions of the universe even now, such as inside black holes, where 
the laws we see in operation more generally do not hold. The second cosmological 
fallacy lies in the assumption that the universe we can see now is necessarily a 
reliable guide to the universe at other times. Unger and Smolin draw a very simple 
conclusion from all this: that we cannot justify “the immutability of the laws of 
nature from their overall stability in the observed universe.”viii Having set out these 
two fallacies, Unger and Smolin go on elaborate a broad critique of contemporary 
cosmology, recommending profound revisions to the way science is conceived and 
practiced that include reversing the priority of structure over history, and 
recognizing that there is a narrative element to scientific explanation. I will say a 
few words about these ideas later, but first I want to focus here on just two points. 
The first concerns the relation between laws and the phenomena they are intended to 
explain, and the second concerns causality, and its relation to law.  
 Science assumes that before a system can be described it must first be 
partitioned from conditions that are considered to lie outside it. Some of these 
conditions, such as the precise arrangement of matter a great distance away, can 
usually be ignored. But other conditions, such as the laws thought to govern the 
development of the system in question, must be taken into consideration. This works 
perfectly well when dealing with specific phenomena and small-scale systems, but it 
becomes problematic when cosmology addresses the universe as a whole. For if, as 
Unger and Smolin suggest, science should avoid appealing to metaphysical 
principles, that is, “the explanation for anything in the universe can involve only 
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other things that also exist in the universe,”ix then the distinction between the initial 
conditions of the universe and the laws that are to govern its development becomes 
problematic. In this case, what bears on the development of the universe at any point 
is no more or less than its total state. The same point can be made by considering the 
extreme conditions of energy and density in the early universe. At this stage, the 
distinctions between constituents of nature that are familiar to us today had yet to 
emerge and there was no “established repertory of natural kinds.”x Without stable 
kinds to describe, laws cannot stand apart from the reality they ostensibly govern. As 
a consequence, they cannot be universal. In fact, in the most extreme circumstances, 
the range of law tends towards a point where it coincides with the phenomena it is 
supposed to govern, because there is no reason to assume that the consistency law 
requires extends any further.xi In such conditions, again, the distinction between laws 
of nature and the phenomena they govern breaks down. As Unger and Smolin are 
quick to point out, this does not entail the breakdown of order into chaotic 
confusion, because causal connections continue to be effective even where there is 
no over-arching law to determine how they will occur: “what comes before will 
always shape what comes later, even if the mechanism of influence may change.”xii 
Rather than moving from a strongly determined universe to one without meaningful 
laws, Unger and Smolin argue that laws and the phenomena they govern develop in 
tandem, their difference being more one of degree than of kind. Although the coeval 
development of laws and phenomena will be most evident in extreme states of the 
universe where the degrees of structure and regularity we see today have yet to 
emerge and the difference between laws and phenomena are consequently slight, the 
reciprocal effect remains even in regions and periods of stability: it is a matter only 
of degree and historical perspective.  
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 An obvious objection to raise is that to allow change to be governed by laws 
that can themselves change is to usher in a crisis in the foundations of science. For if 
there is no still more fundamental law to determine how laws themselves change, 
science appears to give up its claim on a final explanation – it can no longer provide 
the sufficient reason for things being as they are and not otherwise. This is the 
predicament to which I referred earlier, and which Unger and Smolin call the 
conundrum of the meta-laws: either there is no law to determine how things change, 
or there must be a higher order law that we have yet to find. But the truth is that to 
phrase the problem this way is to phrase it badly, for science is already unable to 
provide a sufficient reason for things being the way they are, simply because it 
cannot account for why the laws and the initial conditions of the universe as a whole 
are the way they are. Recognizing that there is no need to lament the loss of what 
science never truly had, Unger and Smolin point out that we are accustomed to think 
that causality depends on laws, but this is not necessarily the case. Rather, “causality 
exists without laws, which is a way of saying that causal connections have not 
acquired, or have lost, the repetitious form, over a differentiated range of nature, that 
makes it possible to distinguish phenomena from laws.”xiii As noted already, this was 
the condition of the early universe, when the distinction between regularities of 
nature and states of affairs (or laws and initial conditions) could not be made. In the 
absence of what we think of as law, “states of affairs may have been excited to 
higher degrees of freedom and allow for a broader range of adjacent possibles than 
we usually (but not always) observe in the established universe.”xiv Such regularities 
as there were at this early stage were partial and non-binding, but nonetheless 
change was not random. As the universe cooled, the structure familiar to us today 
emerged and regularities became so well established that laws could be separated off 
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from the states of affairs they describe, heuristically at least. They could even be 
mistaken for laws that are eternally fixed, but this would be to ignore variations in 
the laws themselves that only become visible over longer periods of time. No one 
region of the universe or period of its history can be counted on to reveal the most 
basic truths of nature.xv Instead, Unger and Smolin argue, “we do better to think of 
the laws of nature as deriving from causal connections rather than to see the latter as 
deriving from the former, as we are accustomed to do.”xvi This is to say, causal 
structure comes first and laws follow. It is only when causal structure has reached a 
settled state that laws can be separated from the phenomena they govern. But this 
can change. Structure, then, derives from history, and not the other way around. But 
it also both “constrains and enables later historical development.”xvii Accordingly, 
scientific explanation is itself ultimately historical, tracing events and the way they 
occur back to what came before without expecting to reach a final point where 
whole the story began and explanation stops.xviii There is, they suggest, no final 
answer to the question of why events at a certain point in the history of the universe 
were as they were, or why the laws that describe their development are what they 
are. But whereas science that appeals to universal laws has to acknowledge this as an 
inexplicable limit to its understanding, the model of science that Unger and Smolin 
propose simply continues to trace conditions and laws back to earlier conditions and 
laws. In this way, they give up the strictly Leibnizian demand for sufficient reason, 
while still holding that a reason for why things are as they are and not otherwise can 
be found, and all this without leaving room for a truth that is in principle beyond the 
reach of science, and that might be the province of some other, arguably higher, 
discipline.xix  
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iii. 
I will now tell the story of the precedence of causality to law from the point of view 
of Lucretius. 
 Lucretius tells us that his aim in writing De Rerum Natura was to release his 
fellow human beings from the fear inspired by the belief that their lives were subject 
to capricious and unpredictable gods. To this end, he encouraged the reader to see, 
following his explanations, that the natural world was governed by stable laws. If 
this were to mean that the movement and interactions of atoms are everywhere and 
always the same, one might object that he simply replaced the willful interventions 
of gods,xx without considering all the implications of living in a world governed by 
absolute laws whose origin is unknown and unknowable. Although such laws may 
be less terrifying, insofar as they may be understood and events made more 
predictable, they would still be remote and would not themselves belong to the order 
they governed. Such a view adopts the vantage point of the rebirth of atomism in 
early modern science and misses much of what is most novel and interesting in 
Lucretius. In particular, it runs counter to an aspiration running through his work to 
explain the world from the world itself, and above all on the basis of the principle 
that only atoms and void exist.xxi 
 The basic elements of Lucretius’ account are simple. The universe is infinite 
in extent, and has always existed and everything in it is composed of atoms and 
void. Atoms are infinite in number, but finite in variety and size, and combine to 
form the ordered world that we see around us. All order emerges as a consequence 
of chance collisions with no guiding principle or τέλος. Some collisions between 
atoms lead to combinations that are more stable than others, and some of these recur, 
and as they do so they form regularities that make subsequent events more or less 
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likely. In this way, pockets of order emerge and persist as atoms combine according 
to these regularities, but nothing lasts forever and all order is destined eventually to 
break down, releasing atoms to flow off towards new combinations and new forms 
of order.xxii The laws that shape events are therefore regularities that emerge from 
the sequences of events themselves, as they are for Unger and Smolin; and, like 
them, Lucretius proposes that causality precedes law.xxiii  
 How do atoms actually move, collide, and combine? Imagining something 
like a beginning, Lucretius sees them raining down uniformly through the void in a 
laminar flow, driven by their own weight, the heavy and the light moving at the 
same speed.xxiv The fall of atoms in a laminar flow has a mythical quality to it that 
reminds me of how, it is said, in Romania they used to begin their old tales: “It was a 
time and it was no time…”xxv The account promises both safe harbor and shipwreck. 
For although the universe has no absolute origin, it has a narrative structure and one 
can trace events back to an earlier time. Yet in doing so one arrives at a state that 
contains no information about the initial conditions from which the later universe 
arose, and next to nothing about the laws that were to give form to that becoming. In 
this respect the laminar flow plays a role very much like the initial chaos in Hesiod’s 
theogony: lacking all determination, it puts a stop to any narrative driven by the 
questions “Why this?” and “Where did it come from?”xxvi More specifically, the 
laminar flow does this in the context of a universe that is temporally infinite. Its 
purpose is to allay any suspicion that further back there may have been a time in 
which the initial conditions and the law that governed their development were 
separate. Instead, the separation of initial conditions and laws that is assumed to be 
fundamental in the scientific account of any given system becomes problematic, as it 
is for Unger and Smolin when dealing with the universe as a whole. Moreover, 
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Lucretius writes that if the rain of atoms in parallel were not interrupted, then atoms 
would rain down through the void without colliding, but he does not imply that such 
an uninterrupted flow actually lasted for any significant period of time: indeed, no 
period could be significant in a universe that is temporally infinite. The laminar flow 
has always already been interrupted and, unlike Hesiod’s story of the universe, the 
Lucretian narrative refers back to a state that the universe may not actually have 
occupied. But whether or not the laminar flow has a place in the chronological series 
of events, it features in the logical order of the universe. Its primary effect is less to 
put an artificial stop to the narrative of the universe reaching further and further into 
the past than to block a particular kind of explanation; that is, an explanation that 
relies on the separation between laws and the conditions to which they apply. The 
Lucretian story of the rain of atoms tells us not only that the historical narrative has 
no true beginning, but also that it unfolds without a fundamental separation between 
laws and initial conditions.  
 For order to emerge, atoms must collide, and this comes about by virtue of a 
spontaneous change in direction that Lucretius variously describes using the verbs 
depellere,xxvii declinare,xxviii and inclinare,xxix the root of the latter two giving the 
noun clinamen,xxx which is often translated as “swerve,” but also sometimes retained 
without translation.  
 
While atoms move by their own weight straight down 
Through the empty void, at quite uncertain times 
And uncertain places they swerve [depellere] slightly from their 
course.xxxi 
 
Pre-publication copy – please do not cite 
 
The clinamen gives the primal equilibrium a needed tilt, and as such serves as a kind 
of first event, albeit one that is uncaused and which thereby stands as a blank 
counterpart to the laminar flow it disrupts, each operating as a limit to our 
understanding. Yet in spite of how it may appear, the clinamen is not just an ad hoc 
device to trigger the processes from which everything will follow in law like 
fashion.xxxii Such an objection assumes that the clinamen should not really happen: it 
assumes there is a natural motion from which it departs for no good reason. Could 
the fall of atoms through the void not be such a natural motion, and would such 
motion not imply the existence of an underlying law? After all, when left to 
themselves atoms will move this way of their own accord,xxxiii and this could be 
described as a kind of natural motion. The truth is it could be so described, but not in 
the usual sense. According to Newton, a body naturally moves at a constant velocity 
unless acted on by an external force. When there is a departure from natural motion 
an explanation is required, and that explanation, which is causal, depends on a law 
that encompasses both the natural motion and the state to which it is perturbed by 
the external force: the same laws govern the natural motion of a body, its 
perturbation, and its motion after the perturbation. But this is not the case in 
Lucretius. An atom falling through the void by its own weight may be perturbed by a 
strike from another atom, but the very “first” perturbation is caused by the clinamen, 
which strictly speaking is not an “external force” since the atom is not struck by 
anything else. Moreover, once atoms begin to collide, the regularities that emerge 
take over from the basic principles that atoms fall, collide, and combine. Therefore, 
there is no law that determines both the “natural” system and the perturbed system: 
each change in the movement of atoms leads directly or indirectly to a change in the 
regularities that shape the movement of atoms in the future. So while it is true that 
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without the clinamen atoms would not collide and therefore could not combine to 
form the world we see around us, as a spontaneous deviation in the movement of an 
atom, the clinamen does not violate any fundamental physical law, because there are 
none. The fall of atoms as a laminar flow is not law governed, rather it is simply the 
condition of equilibrium from which order emerges: both ordered states and the 
“law” that orders them, which is in fact just a regularity that has reached a settled 
form. 
 Smolin makes a similar point from the perspective of contemporary 
cosmology. There is, he writes, symmetry in a system when it can be changed in a 
certain respect without disturbing the overall character of that system; for example, a 
sphere is symmetrical with respect to space, because rotating it does not change its 
shape. As Smolin notes, the systems in classical and quantum mechanics that have 
symmetries involve an isolated system moving relative to an external frame of 
reference (Unger and Smolin 2015: 369). But this cannot be replicated with the 
whole universe because there is nothing relative to which it can move. Invoking 
Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles, Smolin observes that “the 
universe as a whole has no symmetries.”xxxiv But symmetries are associated with 
properties that are conserved under transformation, and so “it is then proper to 
regard the great conservation laws of physics – of energy, momentum, and angular 
momentum – as emergent and approximate.”xxxv As a consequence, an account of 
the universe as a whole can have no global symmetries or conservation laws, which 
runs directly counter to the received wisdom that the more fundamental the theory 
the more symmetry it must have. It turns out that this apparently troubling 
conclusion points cosmology towards a solution for a persistent and difficult 
problem. For if symmetry were key to a theory of the universe as a whole, one 
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would either have to explain why the symmetry is broken or accept that there is a 
gap in our knowledge that the theory cannot explain. It is in part to avoid this 
predicament that Unger and Smolin propose that laws and initial conditions 
converge when it is a matter of the universe as a whole. They then draw the 
following conclusion: 
 
Our universe should not be seen as a vast collection of elementary events, 
each simple and identical to the others, but the opposite, a vast set of 
elementary processes, no two of which are alike in all details. At this level 
fundamental principles may be discerned but there are no general laws in the 
usual sense.xxxvi 
 
The basic principles to which Unger and Smolin refer here are higher order 
regularities that, while not immune from change, change more slowly and help to 
give form to lower order laws and ultimately to phenomena. They include the 
principle of least action, and the principle of the conservation of energy.xxxvii 
Analogous principles for Lucretius would be those stating that atoms fall by their 
own weight, and that combinations of atoms are formed as they collide. Such 
principles provide a general framework within which change occurs but they are not 
sufficient to determine each interaction. In Unger and Smolin’s terms, they do not 
determine the causal structure of events, which for Unger and Smolin, as for 
Lucretius, depends on the regularities that form locally in time and space. 
 Once the rain of atoms down through the void is disrupted by the clinamen, a 
chain reaction of collisions multiplies and spreads. Turbulence ensues, and from this 
near chaos degrees of order gradually emerge. Lucretius describes the process as 




For sure, not by design or intelligence 
Did primal atoms place themselves in order, 
Nor did they make contracts, you may be certain, 
As to what movements each of them should make. 
But many primal atoms in many ways 
Moving through infinite time up to the present, 
Clashing among themselves and carried by their own weight, 
Have come together in every possible way, 
Tried every combination that could be made; 
And so advancing through vast lengths of time, 
Exploring every union and motion, 
At length those of them came together 
Which by a sudden conjunction interfused 
Often become the beginnings of great things – 
Of earth and sea and sky and living creatures.xxxviii  
 
The movement of atoms is not coordinated and harmonious, as one would expect if 
there were fundamental laws. Instead, while the fall of atoms ensures that movement 
of some kind continues, how atoms combine and the arrangement they assume is a 
matter of chance. The suggestion that the order of the universe, and more 
specifically the values of the constants in the fundamental equations of physics, may 
have arisen purely by chance fell out of favor in modern science as the sheer scale of 
the odds involved became clear. For there to be order in the universe at all, and 
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certainly on the scale we can see, the constants have to be set to with such precision 
that chance no longer seems a compelling explanation. It was in part to address this 
problem that Smolin first proposed the idea that the laws of nature may evolve 
across the birth and death of many universes, those universes most likely to give rise 
to order reproducing in such a way that the value of the physical constants settled 
closer and closer to the values we see in our own universe.xxxix Lucretius gets around 
the problem simply by regarding the universe as temporally and spatially infinite, 
thereby allowing for all permutations to arise at some point, as different worlds 
form, grow, decay, and disappear. However, there is a principle of selection at work 
here, too, insofar as those combinations of atoms which produce order survive and 
are therefore able to give rise to modifications from which there is then a higher 
chance of relatively stable states emerging. The essential thing in both cases is that 
order is not determined in advance by fixed laws working on a determinate set of 
initial conditions. It is the regularities themselves that draw matter into a settled 
pattern that repeats and in doing so shapes future events.  
 When they are sufficiently stable, these regularities constitute laws that are 
descriptive, in the sense that they pick out the patterns of change and stability that 
have already emerged. But they are also prescriptive, in the sense that they constrain 
the movement and combination of atoms, and thereby, within limits, the future. As 
atoms combine and fall into regular patterns of movement, some events become 
more likely, and some less, overwhelmingly so in certain cases. As Lucretius writes, 
we see the seasons pass in regular fashion, animal and plant species reproduce, first 
beards grow and then with age teeth fall out:  
 
For since the causes from the first beginning 
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Were of this nature, and from the first beginning 
Things happened in this way, in sequence then 
And order fixed they even now recur.xl 
 
However, the order is never universally binding. It is significant that Lucretius 
applies the term “fixed [certo]” here, to the order of events, and not to a law that 
might be thought to underpin them. Certo means “settled” more than “fixed 
forever.” In particular, it may refer to “what has been agreed” – a fitting sense, given 
that order emerges from the conjunction of atoms that Lucretius names the foedera 
natura and Michel Serres describes as an alliance or treaty.xli Such an alliance cannot 
last forever, because nothing in the Lucretian universe does: “all things are 
continually in flux,”xlii and even the present arrangement of the earth, the sea, and 
the sky are expected eventually to break down and give way to other forms of 
composition.xliii For Lucretius, the question of why certain phenomena occur as they 
do is not, in the end, a question about laws. It is a historical question. In fact, all 
fundamental questions are historical, because there is nothing changeless to which 
the changing world can be referred, or against which it can be measured. Order is 
local; that is, not merely the local manifestation of universal laws and principles, but 
a singular regularity in which events and the order they exhibit are in continual 
dialogue. An account of such order will be historical, tracing both the causal series 
and the causal structure, the sequence of events and the rule permitting the sequence 
to continue.  
 Unger and Smolin embrace this conclusion and argue that cosmology will 
only be able properly to stake its claim to be “the most comprehensive natural 
science” when it understands itself as fundamentally a historical science.xliv 
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Cosmology must speak not just of things, events, and the laws by which they are 
determined, but also of the way the laws evolve, and of the changing causal structure 
that articulates this evolution. Unger and Smolin (Unger especially) are mindful that 
a model has already become well established in the social sciences and the life 
sciences,xlv and acknowledge that their project could be described as bringing such 
practices to bear on natural science. But it is worth pausing to ask whether the social 
and life sciences genuinely provide the kind of model actually required by the 
account Unger and Smolin propose. Evaluating the models of law used in the social 
and life sciences is too big a task to take on here, but it is possible at least to set out 
what is at stake.  
 
iv. 
If “law” is no longer ideal, universal and fixed, then it needs to be fundamentally re-
thought, and not just recast in a weakened form. It must not be an essentially 
changeless law that has had the misfortune to fall into time and then be nudged from 
one state to another, each time as if fixed for good, until the next change. Such a 
conception of law would hand down the old assumption that matter is inert and 
mute, and that it requires organizing principle of some to give it form it and enliven 
it. Referring to “regularities” is a first step, but the idea that regularity somehow 
“acts” to sustain a sequence still implies the transcendence of something like a rule 
to the order of events it governs, which is just what first Lucretius and then Unger 
and Smolin wish to avoid. The trouble is, the idea of regularity tells us very little 
about how it sustains itself. The sense of law must properly begin with matter itself 
and not just be susceptible to change by virtue of matter. On this point, accounts of 
complexity and emergence offer a way forward, but Michel Serres is particularly 
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helpful.  
 Thinking of the clinamen as the first departure from the laminar flow of 
atoms raining down through the void, Serres elegantly captures the way that 
regularities, and thereby laws, emerge when he writes that “the pre-model of the 
fundamental physics has no laws,” but that “as soon as a phenomenon appears, as 
soon as a body is formed, a law can be expressed.”xlvi Borrowing from information 
theory, he likens the emergence of order in the combination of atoms to the 
emergence of language, as indeed does Lucretius,xlvii and observes that “the law 
repeats the fact itself: as things are composing, the laws express the federated.”xlviii 
The code that describes how atoms move and combine arises “as soon as the 
deviation from equilibrium takes place,” and “determination is nothing but the 
retention of the code.”xlix Serres makes no distinction here between code and law, 
but elsewhere he does, and the difference is significant for the broader account of 
causality.  
 Roughly speaking, code and law belong at either end of a process of making 
sense that begins with matter and ends with science (though science is not the only 
possible outcome). According to both Lucretius and Serres, everything continually 
flows, and the only truly basic principle is that everything flows towards 
equilibrium. Order is the slowing of this return. It is delay. But what causes the 
delay? And why does a particular order form, and not some other? Serres writes that 
matter’s route back to equilibrium is not direct because it flows along paths, which 
thereby place a constraint on what states can follow from any given configuration. 
The path is a regularity. But paths are not fixed. They follow the most direct 
available route back to equilibrium around the obstacles in their way, and these 
obstacles are simply conjunctions of other paths – other regularities.l Matter is 
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simply caught up in a series of games of its own devising. It gets in its own way, 
diverting itself, giving itself form. There is no law to determine how this must 
happen, at least no universal law. Sense begins in the form of code as matter first 
combines. But such code does not necessarily give rise to causal structure. In 
L’Incandescent, Serres writes that things act on one another through the forces they 
exert, but that they also communicate, exchanging code.li Quite distinct from law, 
code may be the most ephemeral trace of a sequence that does not last, that matter 
does not remember, long enough to be established as a regularity that we recognize 
and record. Code is the material analogue of what Leibniz called tiny perceptions 
(petites perceptions), the countless events of sensing that fall below the threshold of 
consciousness. Causal structure is that code which is sufficiently established in the 
memory of matter to make the history of a given system or locality calculable, and 
its future predictable.  
 Serres concludes that alongside the physics we know, which identifies the 
causal structure of the physical world, there is a second, which attends to code that 
has not yet become sufficiently regular to warrant speaking of cause and effect, and 
that may not ever do so. It takes the form of a historical narrative, tracing the 
sometimes irregular steps from event to event without the guidance of a fixed law. It 
is a history of the formation, deformation, and reformation of code. Serres doubts 
that we have anything like this second science, writing that we still do not have an 
ear for code that has yet to become cause, for “the clamour of things or the 
background noise of the world.”lii We still need to learn to remember the world as it 
remembers, to leave our mark on the world as it marks itself.liii However, with their 
inversion of the priority that physics usually accords to structure over history, and 
their incorporation into cosmology of the precedence of causal structure over law, 
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Unger and Smolin have shown that there are good reasons for science to consider 
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Notes 
i The title De Rerum Natura [DRN] is normally translated either as On the Nature of 
the Universe or The Nature of Things, or some close variation. In preparing this paper 
I have referred to several editions, but have cited the translation by Ronald Melville, 
published by Oxford University Press.  
ii Charles Sanders Peirce, “The Architecture of Theories,” p. 164. 
iii Émile Boutroux, De la Contingence des Lois de la Nature [Boutroux], p. 2. 
iv Although Unger and Smolin co-authored The Singular Universe and the Reality of 
Time [Universe], the book is divided into two sections, authored individually. 
Although I will for the most part refer to the section authored by Unger, I will not 
specify this in my citations, but will note in the text if Unger and Smolin themselves 
draw the reader’s attention to a difference in their views.  
v Lee Smolin, Three Roads to Quantum Gravity [Gravity], p. 59. 
vi Universe p. 20. 
vii Ibid. 
viii Ibid. p. 267. 
ix Gravity p. 17. 
x Universe p. 269. 
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xi Ibid. p. 270. 
xii Ibid. p. 279. 
xiii Ibid. p. 270. 
xiv Ibid. p. 277. 
xv Ibid. p. 212. 
xvi Ibid p. 281. Boutroux p. 4 proposes a similar idea, when he asks rhetorically: “do 
causes merge with laws [les causes se-confondent avec des lois], as, in the end, the 
doctrine that defines laws as an unchanging relation supposes?”  
xvii Universe p. 288. 
xviii Ibid. p. 372. 
xix Unger and Smolin disagree over this point. Unger prefers to dispense with the idea 
of sufficient reason altogether, whereas Smolin more cautiously proposes to replace it 
with a “principle of differential sufficient reason” according to which, in choosing 
between competing theories, one opts for the one that minimizes questions of the 
form “Why does the universe have property X?” for which there is no rational 
response – by which he means a scientific response that relies solely on what is within 
the universe; see Universe pp. 367-8, 513-5. 
xx DRN I.147, II.62. 
xxi Ibid. I.418-47. 
xxii These ideas are presented at various points in DRN, but in particular at V.107, 
245-80, 1341-7. 
xxiii One reason to think that Lucretius regarded the laws of the universe as fixed is 
that he refers on a number of occasions to the “deep-set boundary stone” marking a 
limit to what can be and what cannot, and thereby also a limit to the power of religion 
and its practitioners to intervene (DRN I.77, II.1087, V.90, VI.66). Although it may be 
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tempting to see this as an invocation of invariant laws, it is not necessary to go that 
far. It would be more consistent with the text as a whole to take the expression “deep-
set boundary stone” as a reference to the constraints imposed by the basic principles 
of atomism. For example, everything is born and dies, and this pattern is repeated 
endlessly across the universe; different stars and planets form and disappear, as do 
different animals, and the species to which they belong. The principle underlying all 
of this is that atoms fall, collide, and combine, but this alone does not determine how 
events in the future will unfold. 
xxiv Ibid. II.230-5. 
xxv Will Buckingham, Finding Our Sea Legs: Ethics, Experience and the Ocean of 
Stories, p. 90. 
xxvi Hesiod writes: “Chaos was first of all […]” (Hesiod and Theognis, Theogeny, 
Works and Days, and Elegies, p. 27).  
xxvii DRN II.219. 
xxviii Ibid. II.221. 
xxix Ibid. II.243. 
xxx Ibid. II.293. 
xxxi Ibid. II.217-19. 
xxxii Lucretius appears to endorse the idea that the clinamen is necessary to account for 
the possibility of free will. Although there is textual support for this reading, the 
argument is far from convincing, and the case for free will seems badly served by 
spontaneous deviations over which it can have no control. On the other hand, free will 
depends on not being determined entirely by external stimuli, and the broader account 
of order in which the clinamen plays a vital part involves a conception of order as 
local that is consistent with the mind having regularities of its own. The will would be 
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the expression of regularities that are neither wholly determined by nature, nor purely 
spontaneous. Understood in this way, the clinamen does make an account of free will 
possible, but not the one that is most obvious. As Lucretius describes it, free will is an 
example of more general processes that are marked by greater or lesser degrees of 
self-regulation, rather than as the exception in world governed by fixed laws.  
xxxiii Ibid. II.202. 
xxxiv Universe p. 369. 
xxxv Ibid. p. 370. 
xxxvi Ibid. p. 371. 
xxxvii Unger and Smolin also refer to the principle of the conservation of momentum, 
the principle of the degradation of energy (Carnot’s principle), and the principle of the 
invariance of the laws of nature for fixed observers or observers in uniform motion; 
ibid. p. 285. 
xxxviii DRN V.419-31; Lucretius give a similar description a few pages earlier at ibid. 
V.187-93. 
xxxix Lee Smolin, The Life of the Cosmos. Unger and Smolin put it this way: “causal 
continuity between successive universes, or between successive periods in the history 
of the one real universe, may be stressed but never broken” Universe p. 111. 
xl DRN V.677-9. 
xli Michel Serres, The Birth of Physics [Birth], p. 113. 
xlii DRN V.280. 
xliii DRN V.91-7. 
xliv Universe p. 42. 
xlv Ibid. p. 71-3. 
xlvi Birth p. 122. 
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xlvii DRN II.686-98. 
xlviii Birth p. 123; I have modifed the translation slightly here. The French runs “La loi 
répète le fait même: pendant que se composent les choses, les lois disent le fédéré” 
(Michel Serres, La Naissance de la Physique dans le Texte de Lucrèce, p. 152).  
xlix Birth pp. 148-9. 
l Ibid. p. 51. 
li Michel Serres, L’Incandescent, p. 60. 
lii Michel Serres, Biogée, p. 38. 
liii L’Incandescent p. 60. 
